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MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General


THROUGH : Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : Pre-departure Damage Assessment

1. Your suggestion, as contained in your memorandum of 2 November 1963 regarding the desirability of ensuring a pre-departure damage assessment in the case of resigning or separated employees, has considerable merit. Our experience in those few cases of this nature which have come to our attention in the past has convinced this Office that it is extremely difficult and often impossible to obtain a precise definition of the degree of compromise that might be involved in the event that a former employee defected or fell into the hands of hostile intelligence organizations.

2. I am sure that you appreciate that the total knowledge accumulated by an Agency employee cannot, in a practical sense, be reduced to a matter of simple record. Nonetheless, any subsequent damage assessment would certainly be more meaningful if this Office had ready access, through the employee's parent component, to a record of his assignment, duties and responsibilities, projects and programs in which he was involved, and some indication as to the general type of intelligence information to which he had continuing access.

3. There are two reasons why a program of this nature would have to be handled by each individual Agency component as opposed to the incorporation of such a debriefing procedure in exit processing by this Office. First, as a practical matter, we do not have the manpower and time available for this purpose. At the present time, we conduct Security interviews with an average of about 178 employees who leave the Agency for various reasons each month. The average

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time spent in each individual interview ranges from 15 to 45 minutes. Secondly, in the interest of compartmentation and "need-to-know" it would appear to be undesirable, if not insecure, to accumulate in this Office records which would reflect in total a broad spectrum of the Agency's sensitive operational activities.

4. In summary, it is believed that it is completely desirable and feasible to incorporate a requirement for the recording of this type of information, by each parent component, into our normal exit processing procedures. This can best be achieved by the development of an appropriate Agency regulation which would include a form to be completed by every supervisor on every employee who leaves the Agency for whatever reason. Compliance with this procedure could be further ensured by requiring a certification that such a debriefing record had been made on the employee's "check out list". If you agree, this Office would be delighted to work with the Office of Personnel in the development of an appropriate Agency regulation to this effect.



R. L. Bannerman
Director of Security

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